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 1 
Learning from Israel? ‘26/11’ and the anti-politics of urban security governance   
Abstract 
This article calls for a greater emphasis on issues of politics and anti-politics within 
critical debates about transnational security governance in the metropolis. While scholars 
have documented the growing popularity of policy “models” and “best practices” in 
policing and urban security planning, we know little about what makes these schemes 
attractive to the officials who enroll them. I take the government of Maharashtra’s 
decision to “learn from Israel” following the 2008 Mumbai attacks (26/11) as an 
invitation to reevaluate the relationships between policymaking, politics and 
depoliticization. Focusing on references to Israeli security knowhow as a “best practice” 
by Maharashtra state officials, I explore how an association with Israel was used to 
negotiate conflicts and controversies that followed 26/11. The article has two aims. First, 
it addresses how transnational policy schemes work anti-politically within particular local 
contexts. Second, it locates counter-terrorism policy as a form of performative politics, 
which is generative of policy problems. In doing so, the article helps to reclaim the 
political contingency of policy responses to terroristic violence and addresses the agency 
of policy actors in the global south. 
Keywords: counter-terrorism, policy mobility, anti-politics, Mumbai, Israel  
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Introduction   
“We [Israelis] have a good reputation in the [security] industry…but...the way we see it, 
it’s not really the best...it’s a different approach based on our personal experience 
and…the way that we have had to deal with threats, which was less theoretical [and] 
more practical...We see a problem and see how best…to solve it.”1  
          
 This article examines the transnational mobility of security knowhow in relation 
to the management of violence in megacities. Focusing on the government of 
Maharashtra’s decision to “learn from Israel” after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, I explore 
“the anti-politics of policy mobility”. Denaturalizing policy decisions as straightforward 
“responses” to particular terroristic events, I locate policymaking as a site of politics 
where conflicts and controversies over security matters are played out. In doing so, I 
address the diagnostic roles of policy decisions in constituting policy problems, 
theorizing them through the lens of performativity.   
 Developed by Judith Butler in the context of gender studies, the concept of 
performativity highlights the reiterative and referential practice, whereby discourse 
generates the outcomes that it names “through a stylized repetition of acts” (Butler, 1988: 
519, emphasis in original). Increasingly, performativity plays a key role in critical 
analysis of contemporary geopolitical trends, importantly contesting the premise of 
preexisting subjects (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). It also represents a “profoundly political 
lens” that makes visible “the situated challenges, obstacles and stumbling blocks” faced 
in the making of security agendas (de Goede et al., 2014: 413-4, emphasis in original). In 
this article I use performativity to address the “set of processes that produce ontological 
effects”—what Butler calls the “illocutionary form of the performative” (Butler, 2010: 
                                                        
1 Interview with Director of Business Development, Israeli security firm  
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147, 150). The emphasis here is on building certain kind of realities (rather than 
producing particular effects) and is associated with forms of sovereign power. 
Performativity helps me to make sense of policy decisions on counter-terrorism and 
further addresses how these decisions intervened in public discourses that followed the 
2008 Mumbai attacks.   
Often known as “India’s 9/11” or  “26/11”, the attacks were “scripted” within the 
Indian media as an unprecedented event that singlehandedly transformed the meaning of 
terrorism in India (Kolås, 2010). This sense of departure can be seen in two inter-related 
ways. First, 26/11 was heralded as the moment when a new form of “global” terrorism 
confronted India. Second, the event was framed as a “failure” of Indian authorities’ 
management of the 3-day long siege of the city (see Kaplan 2009: 306). While these 
representations did not go unchallenged, they proved influential and consequential in two 
ways. First, they had unusual political repercussions: this was the only instance where the 
Indian state’s response to terrorist attacks forced elected officials out of office, following 
a wave of public protests. One commentary noted: “Residents of Mumbai are grieving, 
but also angry. The grief is over the senseless loss of life […] The anger, however, is over 
what was clearly a colossal failure of governance” (Sharma, 2008: 13). Second, 26/11 
was followed by immediate calls for a major institutional overhaul of India’s 
governmental architecture for handling terrorism. In particular, the event generated 
pressure on Indian politicians to address the threat of terrorism by adopting of “hard”, 
“modern” approaches to security management from the West. In the aftermath of 26/11 
the prevailing view was that “terrorism can be stopped or ended by some tough action: 
that India is a soft state and therefore we are facing such attacks. If we become a hard 
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state (read: a militarist state), we can overcome terrorism” (Palshikar, 2008: 11). In 2009 
the government of Maharashtra took up these calls, sending an official delegation to 
Israel under the auspices of seeking expertise in urban counter-terrorism and homeland 
security. Since then Israeli counter-terror experts have trained newly created commando 
units in the city.    
 Post-26/11 policy developments raise broader questions about why cities “learn” 
from policy experiences elsewhere. Given that 26/11 was widely understood as a failure of 
local governmental capacity, the decision to learn from Israel might appear rather 
unproblematic. It also seems to reflect Israel’s position as a leading security purveyor, 
particularly in relation to urban spaces (Graham, 2010). Yet while Israeli security policies 
were quickly valorized as an unequivocal success story in 26/11’s aftermath, Israel’s 
“experience” fighting terrorism is highly controversial. The strategies of control and 
warfare used in Israel/Palestine represent perhaps the quintessential form of contemporary 
colonial rule (Mbembe, 2003), frequently criticized for their brutality. It is also far from 
obvious what Israel offered to Mumbai authorities that was lacking at the local level.  
These issues transcend the case at hand. While scholars have documented the 
growing popularity of policy “models” and “best practices” in policing and security 
planning, we know little about what makes them attractive to the officials who enroll them. 
Furthermore, despite recurring media representations of terrorist attacks like “26/11” as 
self-evident events with supposedly predetermined consequences, there is a need to de-
familiarize the policy “responses” to them and thereby reclaim their political contingency. 
I do so by addressing what Stephens and Vaughan-Williams (2009) call “the politics of 
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response”. In other words, “how responses to terrorism, by politicians, authorities and the 
media, legitimize certain forms of sovereign politics” (ibid: 2).  
So how might we make sense of the impulse to seek Israeli security knowhow in 
in 26/11’s aftermath? Part of the reason why the government of Maharashtra gravitated to 
Israel was because of the strategic actions of the Israeli state, which sought to capitalize 
on 26/11 to expand the reach of Israel’s homeland security industry within India. After 
publicly criticizing India’s handling of 26/11 as primitive and incompetent, Israeli 
government officials offered technical assistance and Israeli trade representatives openly 
declared their intention to exploit 26/11 as a commercial opportunity (see Peretz, 2008). 
These interventions did not come out of nowhere. Since the early 1990s ties between 
Israel and India have strengthened, resulting in an increasingly close bilateral alliance, 
with Israel recently emerging as India’s fourth largest weapons supplier (Oza, 2014). Yet 
Israel’s role in training Indian security forces prior to 2008 was limited. While these 
external pressures and geopolitical ties are important, we must be careful not to overstate 
them. Otherwise we risk obscuring the agency of the officials who take up transnational 
policy regimes, particularly in the global south (Steinberg 2011: 351).In making sense of 
the decision to learn from Israel, the perspectives of local actors therefore need to be 
considered.  
My central claim is that the decision to enroll Israeli security “solutions” must be 
situated in relation to the local public pressures, controversies and conflicts to which 
26/11 gave rise. I take the government of Maharashtra’s decision to learn from Israel as 
an invitation to reevaluate the relationships between policymaking, politics and 
depoliticization, showing how the association with Israel was used strategically by 
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Maharashtra state authorities in managing public dissent and restoring their authority to 
govern.  
I begin by reviewing how the issue of policy transfer has been discussed in 
literature on urban security governance and policing and sketch an alternative theoretical 
framework. I further examine how the decision to seek Israeli expertise was portrayed in 
the Indian media and how state officials explained this decision to me. I then proceed to 
show how learning from Israel was used to negotiate conflicts and controversies that 
followed 26/11. Finally, I intervene in debates about the depoliticization of security.  
This article is based on 10 months of fieldwork in India and Israel, including 
interviews with representatives from Israel’s homeland security industry and public 
officials involved in the state of Maharashtra’s security planning including senior Indian 
Police Service (IPS) officers, bureaucrats and government ministers. I also analysed 
policy documents including the classified High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) report 
(hereinafter known as “the Report”). The Committee was appointed by the government of 
Maharashtra on December 30th, 2008 to look into the handling of the attacks and make 
recommendations to strengthen the state’s governmental architecture for handling future 
terrorist attacks. I approached my interviews with a “self-consciously disruptive posture” 
(Peck and Theodore, 2012: 26) to unsettle and interrogate the taken-for-granted-ness and 
self-implied necessity of policy prerogatives. 
1. The anti-politics of policy mobility       
My analysis begins from the premise that the handling of 26/11 emerged as an 
object of public dissent that previous incidents of terrorism in Bombay/Mumbai had not. 
Specifically, the event quickly became understood both as a technical and governmental 
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failure, prompting an elite-led anti-politician backlash. This “political” response to 26/11, 
however, was articulated as a form of “anti-politics” (Palshikar 2008:11; Sharma 2008). 
As Roy (2009: 316) points out, while the attacks and their aftermath engendered the rise 
of elite-based expressions of citizenship through a language of accountability, 
“[p]aradoxically [...] this particular public articulated its claims through a totalized 
rejection of ‘politics’, which was conflated with histories of corruption and criminal 
inefficiency”. So while 26/11 gave rise to an apparent consensus that perceived 
mishandling of 26/11 represented a narrow technical matter, the event was also 
understood as an abdication of the Indian state to secure its citizens, thereby provoking 
public dissent and controversy. In this context it becomes necessary to unpack the 
broader relationships between policy transfer, politics and anti-politics and security. How 
26/11 became politically contentious and created new public pressures to “secure” 
Mumbai, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in urban spaces as sites of 
security across the social sciences, where the issue of terrorist violence figures centrally 
(Coaffee 2009; Graham 2010).  The urban here is not synonymous with security 
dynamics that simply happen to take place within the space of cities. Rather, the question 
is “how cities, warfare, and terrorism are currently remaking each other” (Graham 2004: 
24). Because the contemporary rescaling of political violence is taking place within the 
context of rapid planetary urbanization, Graham argues that it is imperative “to place the 
intersections of war, terrorism, and subnational – specifically urban – spaces at the center, 
rather than the periphery, of analysis” to conceptualize what he calls an “urban 
geopolitics” (ibid).  Most importantly for my purposes here is that this re-scaling of 
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security is being accompanied by policy interventions, including those of a specifically 
transnational character.  
 Scholars have increasingly drawn attention to the production and transmission of 
knowledge through the sharing of “best practices” (Coaffee et al., 2009b) and export of 
policy “models” (Coaffee, 2009), alongside the growth of global policing networks. 
Much like Israel’s “experience” fighting terrorism, however, scholars frequently note that 
the success of so-called models is far from unequivocal. As Ellison and O’Reilly (2008) 
point out, despite being exported abroad, Northern Ireland’s policing experiences remain 
deeply contested ‘at home’. Jones and Newburn (2007: 2) similarly note the paradox that, 
“despite its alleged faults”, the American criminal justice system has become “strangely 
seductive” among British politicians. They suggest the appeal of policy transfer in the 
area of crime control is largely rhetorical and symbolic, arguing that we “go beyond the 
notion of policy transfer” (132). Swanson (2013: 984) similarly argues that “[t]he transfer 
of zero tolerance [policing strategies] to Latin America is simply a tool for showcasing 
get-tough politicians; its only real merit lies in being a great political catchphrase”. 
Steinberg (2011:351) goes a step further, arguing that the importation of crime prevention 
strategies in post-Apartheid South Africa has been used by political actors “to blunt the 
teeth” of their opponents.    
Despite developing some suggestive insights, there remains much to be done in 
theorizing the relationships between local politics and the global mobility of urban 
security and policing expertise. Here geographical literature on “policy mobilities” 
(McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011) has developed some fruitful avenues. This scholarship has 
emerged as a critique of and alternative to mainstream literature on “policy transfer” 
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(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). It has challenged the conception of policy transfer as the 
literal “export” of policies from one place to another, alternatively situating policy 
transfer as a social, relational and power-laden process. Although scholarship on urban 
security and policing has engaged little with policy mobilities scholarship to date, there is 
much to be gained from a more extensive cross-fertilization between these discussions, 
particularly in conceptualizing the relationships between policy mobility and local 
politics. Scholars have recently linked policy mobility with the suppression of public 
dissent (e.g. McCann, 2011a: 8; Peck, 2011: 176-8; Peck and Theodore, 2010: 206), 
though as Clarke (2012) has recently argued, there is more to be done here, particularly in 
the context of urban governance. To this end, he connects the rise of “anti-politics” 
(Schedler, 1997) with forms of policy mobility and vice versa.  
 While there is considerable variation in how the term is used, anti-politics is 
broadly concerned with active strategies that seek to delimit or close down the space of 
the political – both within a technical setting and in the sense of a wider deliberative 
space. Building on a conception of democratic decision-making based on the centrality of 
language and deliberative process, Schedler (1997: 12-14) frames as “antipolitical” those 
“efforts to subvert communicative rationality of politics and replace it with other, one-
sided forms of rationality”. My focus on the anti-political is quite specific. It concerns 
those practices and strategies that aim to replace popular disagreement (Rancière 1999) 
with consensus among a narrow group of stakeholders, particularly through appeals to 
scientific or technocratic expertise. In aftermath of 26/11 there were forms of 
disagreement surrounding three main issues: the basic facts of what actually took place 
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during the attacks, who or what was responsible for alleged failures, and the kinds of 
measures that might be undertaken to resolve any such deficiencies. 
 I draw on anti-politics scholars in two ways. First, is their assertion that the 
practice of politics often takes place through active strategies to delimit the space of the 
political. Anti-political tendencies, in other words, should be understood as part of, rather 
than an alternative to the operation of politics (Barry, 2002; Hindess, 1997). Of particular 
concern is the uncertain boundary between forms of political and anti-political activity as 
observed in the practice of politics (see Barry 2002: 271).  Second, anti-politics literature 
is helpful in moving beyond the prevailing conception of depoliticization in terms of 
“rendering technical” (Büscher, 2010). I build on this scholarship by exploring the anti-
political repercussions of governance through best practice.  
In my work on Israel’s emergence as a homeland security “model” ( ), I 
have made no reference to it as a “best practice” because the term never came up in my 
discussions with Israeli security industry representatives. The few times I did introduce 
the notion, it either failed to resonate at all or was actively rebuffed. Yet the term was 
used by a number state officials in Mumbai, sometimes specifically in relation to Israel. 
This raised questions of why Indian officials invoked Israel as a best practice when the 
purveyors of Israeli security expertise resisted this designation? It also provoked my 
interest in addressing the role of this term in legitimizing policy decisions.2 In other 
respects, however, the use of the term is less than surprising. After all, best practice is 
nothing if not utterly ubiquitous; it has emerged as an influential buzzword and 
                                                        
2 I have found no media references to Israeli urban security knowhow as a “best practice” by public 
officials in the context of post-26/11 Mumbai. My understanding of how best practice learning “works”, 
then, is derived from my own private conversations with police and government officials who invoked the 
term.  
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governmental/public policy strategy over the past few decades, characterized by its 
intuitive, commonsensical appeal. As Morrell and Lucas (2012: 184) point out, “[t]he 
idea that […] there is a model of ‘best practice’ […] is appealing because it suggests a 
route to effective administration without the substantial costs and risks associated with 
learning or experiment”. The “logic” here is that the most efficient approach to 
policymaking takes place by emulating the practices of other successful paradigmatic 
cases to avoid “reinventing the wheel”. 
Among critical scholars the concept of best practice has been treated skeptically, 
though has not been fully interrogated. For instance, literature on the privatization of 
security notes the role of best practice alongside other neoliberal governance regimes like 
benchmarking and standardization (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007a: 134; Leander and 
van Munster, 2007: 209). Policy mobilities scholars have problematized the concept 
considerably by contesting the idea that the “best” designation can be taken at its word. 
However, the tendency is to put inverted commas around the term and leave it at that. 
Building on this work, I seek to better understand how best practice learning actually 
works anti-politically by examining it in practice.  
2. Learning from Israel  
Before examining the decision to learn from Israel more closely, I briefly address 
the nature and consequences of the interactions between Israeli counter-terror experts and 
Maharashtra authorities, which began shortly after 26/11. While occasional media reports 
of Israeli trainers working with special units in Mumbai remain ongoing, there have been 
stories suggesting that high costs and a lack of funds constrained the use of Israeli 
trainers by local authorities. Israeli security firms also faced challenges gaining public 
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contracts with Indian state authorities in Maharashtra and elsewhere. Accordingly, a 
number of such companies decided to exit the Indian market entirely in the years since 
2008. The effects of learning from Israel are also far from definitive. Certain officials did 
mention specific contributions of the Israeli private contractors who provided training to 
local forces. For instance, I was told that Israeli trainers provided local police with 
expertise in “built-up area intervention” for hostage rescue and disaster management 
operations as well as some “good practices” in shooting and training in the Israeli martial 
art Krav Maga. 3 Yet my discussions with Indian officials who traveled to Israel 
suggested that the delegation did not result in the transfer of counter-terror expertise or 
security technology from Israel to Mumbai. These officials struggled to recall any 
substantive lesson or tactic that they had picked up during their stay and categorically 
rejected the suggestion that a foreign model – Israeli or otherwise – had been taken up by 
the Mumbai city or Maharashtra state police. Thus despite official statements to the 
contrary (see below), the scope of Israel’s activities in Mumbai has proven rather limited. 
Yet the lack of identifiable policy outcomes resulting from the interactions between 
Israeli security experts and Indian officials should not be read as a failure. It points to the 
importance of moving beyond the idea of policy transfer as a straightforward process 
involving the literal transfer of expertise.  
            What is striking about the decision to learn from Israel is its intuitive appeal; it 
seems to flow straightforwardly from media portrayals of 26/11 as a technical failure of 
local capacity. For instance, on the eve of the delegation to Israel in 2009, a leading 
Indian journalist remarked that given the clear deficiencies in the handling of 26/11, it is 
                                                        
3 Fmr. Senior IPS officer, Mumbai City and Maharashtra State Police (Ret’d)  
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unsurprising that the government of Maharashtra “was the first off the block to respond to 
Tel Aviv’s offer for assistance to export its expertise on counter-terror responses and 
homeland security” (Sarin, 2009a). After returning from his visit to Israel, newly 
appointed Mumbai Commissioner of Police D. Sivanandan declared that, in sharp 
contrast to Israel, which responds unapologetically to terrorist attacks, India suffered 
from its lack of a similar “killer instinct”: “For thousands of years, we [Indians] have 
been passively witnessing terror attacks. We never want to fight with anybody. That’s 
what our main problem is and we lack the killer instinct” (cited in Times of India, 2009). 
He further proclaimed that “[w]e will strongly recommend replication of certain Israeli 
solutions in India”, praising their standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency 
management (cited in Sarin, 2009a).   
Media coverage of the visit to Israel gave the impression that some coherent 
Israeli model for urban security was available and ready for adoption. One article claimed 
that the “team will look to develop, with Israeli cooperation, a total security solution for a 
city like Mumbai in order to prevent another 26/11-type terrorist attack” (Sarin, 2009b). 
Another similarly asserted that “[t]he decision to visit Israel was taken after a consensus 
among senior [police] officers and the government, that 26/11 had exposed several chinks 
in the city’s armour, and plugging them would need a complete overhaul of police’s 
approach towards security” (Tiwary, 2009a). In this way, learning from Israel was 
portrayed as a kind of catchall solution to a set of alleged technical deficiencies at the 
local level.          
 Upon closer inspection, however, the decision to learn from Israel is far from 
straightforward. First, there was never any obvious need to which the delegation to Israel 
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actually responded. While officials like Sivanandan publically lauded Israeli security 
approaches, at no point did they specify what was lacking at the local level in terms of 
technical knowhow nor did they spell out how the use of Israeli security expertise would 
help to address any alleged gaps. Second, the decision to seek Israeli solutions in no way 
reflected the Report’s findings. While the Report makes a number of recommendations, 
there was no suggestion that foreign expertise was necessary to improve Mumbai’s 
security preparedness. In fact, the Report did not serve as the basis of the post-2008 
policy process. Many key decisions were taken before it was even submitted to the 
government on April 18, 2009. The document was later classified and partially rejected 
just before its scheduled release in 2009. Finally, there were questions of fit. Even 
advocates of Israeli security approaches raised doubts about their applicability to Indian 
conditions (e.g. Rajiv, 2009). Thus, far from being obvious, the decision to learn from 
Israel actually raises a number of very basic questions. Why did the government of 
Maharashtra look to Israeli security experts as a solution to 26/11? What specific needs 
did the Israeli’s help to address? Why was Israel chosen as a source of expertise (as 
opposed to others) and how was its status as a best practice determined?    
Unsurprisingly, when questioned, the interested parties invoked the common 
sense logic of best practice, claiming their deference to Israel was uncontroversial. As 
one former officer emphasized, “we thought they [the Israelis] are one of the best in 
combating urban terrorism and because of that we took the help of an Israeli company”.4 
Maharashtra’s Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Rakesh Maria similarly maintained that 
the impulse to source Israeli trainers for Maharashtra’s newly created commando unit 
                                                        
4 Jayant Umranikar, Fmr. Director General of Police (Special Operations), Maharashtra State Police (Ret’d) 
   
 15 
Force One was driven by the need to get the “best in the field”.5 Police officials further 
presented the impulse as a response to various unspecified needs, which could not be met 
by local expertise. For instance some told me that Israeli trainers were sought only in 
cases where “we have fallen short of skills” 6 and because “this kind of training was not 
available [locally]”.7  
In addition to seeking possible motivations of best practice learning, I asked 
officials what “best” or “good” actually signifies and how this quality might be 
ascertained. Just as the impetus for seeking Israeli expertise was presented as obvious, so, 
too, was the status of best. As Sivanandan told me, “Good means they [the Israelis] are 
the best in the world and there is a perception...Between you and me, Israelis are 
considered to be the best in security matters. That’s it”.8 Police officials thereby 
presented “best-ness” as a global professional consensus rather than a quality they 
ascertained for themselves.        
Yet upon further interrogation official accounts became far less neat. For instance, 
in explaining how to assess best-ness, one former high-ranking IPS officer claimed that 
“All this is available today in the Internet world...there is nothing that you don’t 
know…you know who is the best…[and] who [the] second was”. When I asked him to 
elaborate, his account became far less definitive: “instead of trying to arrive at who’s the 
best and who’s not, you…[just] pick from here, pick from there and you’re getting each 
one”, insisting that “it’s not that only just one person is the best in the world only and has 
                                                        
5 Rakesh Maria, Anti Terrorist Squad chief, Maharashtra State Police  
6 Dhanushyakodi (D.) Sivanandan, Fmr. Mumbai Commissioner of Police (Ret’d)   
7 Umranikar 
8 Sivanandan 
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to be brought”.9 So although best practice suggests competition between rivals, achieving 
a best designation did not seem to rule out their less-than-best peers.  
Officials most frequently cited Israel as a leading source of urban security 
knowhow but I was told that other foreign experts from the US, the UK, Germany and 
Russia also provided various forms of assistance and training after 26/11. They further 
claimed that it was advantageous to get diverse foreign experts and trainers, each 
apparently offering slightly different (though never specified) attributes. Yet, there was 
no evidence to suggest that the attributes of these different foreign experts had been 
systematically compared with one another. So while designating something as “best” 
clearly implies some kind of calculation or comparison, my interviews revealed no 
evidence that any such procedures had been carried out.     
Furthermore, while the impulse to seek Israeli expertise was presented as a direct 
response to certain gaps in local knowhow, as I probed which specific deficiencies it 
might have addressed, such narratives quickly changed course. For instance 
Maharashtra’s former Home Secretary Jayant Patil explained the decision to go to Israel 
as part of an impulse to develop a “scientific approach” to counter-terrorism, disaster 
management and coordination within the Mumbai police. Yet when I asked him if 26/11 
had revealed a lack of expertise at the local level, he responded: “No, expertise is very 
much there in [the] Mumbai police; there is no doubt about expertise”.10 Another former 
senior IPS officer who had stressed the importance of sourcing the best, similarly 
qualified that it was not as though “you needed necessarily only external experts to create 
                                                        
9 Fmr. Senior IPS officer, Mumbai City and Maharashtra State Police (Ret’d)  
10 Jayant Patil, Fmr. Home Minister, Government of Maharashtra 
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that specialization...that was not the case”.11 In addition to raising questions about the 
basis for demand, officials suggested that the contributions of Israeli expertise could not 
be taken for granted. Even Sivanandan who had publicly advocated for the adoption of 
Israeli solutions expressed deep skepticism about its underlying relevance to Mumbai. As 
he bluntly put it, “Israel is only [a] 7 million population. We are talking about 1.2 billion 
people! The Israeli model will [therefore] not be applicable to India”.12 
Thus far from presenting a coherent account of why seeking expertise from Israel 
emerged as a policy prerogative, official accounts muddied the waters in many ways. 
While invoking the intuitive logic of best practice to explain the impulse to seek Israeli 
expertise, they also frequently contradicted the basic tenets of this mode of reasoning, 
referring to local needs as the reason for seeking Israeli expertise but failing to provide a 
coherent answer to why Israel might be considered best practice. Although claiming that 
Israel was best, they insisted that seeking a range of other less-than-best practices was 
also somehow necessary. Most surprisingly, the applicability of Israeli security solutions 
to Mumbai - the essential premise of learning from Israel - was put into question by the 
very officials who had publicly advocated their adoption. Official accounts thus 
ultimately failed to really explain why learning from others was so essential and what 
Israel specifically contributed.  
These rationalizations might seem to suggest a lack of knowledge on the part of 
policymakers. Yet such a position would unduly imply that officials were somehow blind 
to the practical limitations of the policy measures that they put into place. Officials did 
seem dogmatically committed to the value of best practice learning. This was not because 
                                                        
11 Fmr. Senior IPS officer, Mumbai City and Maharashtra State Police (Ret’d)  
12 Sivanandan  
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they were somehow oblivious to its practical limitations. In fact, they were well aware 
that engagement with Israeli security experts was unlikely to bring about a radical 
overhaul of local security approaches, with some going as far as to claim that knowledge 
transfer was never exactly their ambition to begin with.    
Making sense of the decision to learn from Israel takes us back to the 
government’s handling of the Pradhan Committee. As I have noted above, the 
Committee’s findings did not serve as the basis of post-26/11 policy developments in 
Maharashtra. The Report, therefore, had little direct effect on the nature of the policy 
response to 26/11, including the decision to learn from Israel. The story, however, is 
somewhat more complicated. Maharashtra politicians did not simply refuse to implement 
the Committee’s recommendations but actively fought to suppress its findings. At this 
same time, they undertook costly policy decisions that did not reflect the Report’s 
suggestions. So while the Committee clearly took its mandate very seriously, it is quite 
clear that leading state politicians employed it to control public discourse and to pre-empt 
further political fallout.  
More specifically, the handling of the Report can be better understood as an 
attempt to take the conversation about the lessons of 26/11 elsewhere. Whereas the 
document focuses on a wide range of lapses and problems such as the duplication of 
duties, a lack of basic police firearm training and a failure to follow existing SOPs, 
learning from Israel gave the impression that alleged (local) deficiencies could be easily 
solved by seeking the best in training and expertise from the global leader in counter-
terrorism and homeland security. As I argue next, making sense of the decision to learn 
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from Israel requires contending with the fact that this move had specifically nothing to do 
with the Pradhan Committee’s findings.  
3. Changing the conversation       
 Interested parties actively leveraged the deference to Israel as a marker of post-
26/11 progress. In fact, certain officials brought up recourse to foreign expertise as proof 
that their newly created commando units can be considered world class. This suggested 
that the value of the delegation to Israel had something to do with the political optics of 
associating the Mumbai police with Israel. Indeed, a number of police officials spoke of 
the roles of foreign trainers in terms of inspiring public “confidence”. In this light, 
deference to Israel can be seen as an effort to “arm” the Mumbai police against charges of 
weakness and incompetence by way of association with an allegedly proven case of 
policy success. For instance, when I asked one senior IPS officer what Israeli trainers 
brought to the table that was not available locally, he responded that you want someone 
with real-world “experience”. As he explained, the Israelis have demonstrated credentials 
of having faced terrorism on a routine rather than merely sporadic basis, making Israeli 
police trainers an obvious choice.13 Thus Israel’s status as a source of “combat proven” 
urban security knowledge (Graham, 2010) clearly made it attractive to police officials. 
Rather than approaching the appeal of Israeli security solutions in some general abstract 
way, however, I want to situate it politically within the Indian context.  
 Indian media commentaries on the handling of 26/11 referenced to India’s alleged 
“envy” of Israel, for the perceived impunity with which Israel is able to strike “terrorists” 
in enemy territory. One article immediately following 26/11 suggested that Israel was 
                                                        
13 Deven Bharti, Special Inspector General (Law and Order), Maharashtra State Police 
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looked to by Indian security agencies with a sense of admiration, claiming “Israeli 
expertise in striking at its enemies across borders and continents was widely envied [by 
Indian security authorities]” (Bedi and McElroy, 2008).  In a later article, an Indian 
politician argued: “Whereas many regard Israel’s toughness as its principal characteristic, 
India’s own citizens view their country as a soft state, its underbelly easily penetrated by 
determined terrorists [...] Terrorism has taken more lives in India than in any country in 
the world after Iraq, and yet, unlike Israel, India has seemed unable to do anything about 
it” (Tharoor, 2009). Clearly, then, Sivanandan’s praise of Israel’s “killer instinct” 
resonates within these wider discussions over India’s “soft” approach to security. Indeed, 
India’s perceived unwillingness to take retaliatory military action against Pakistan 
following terrorist attacks represents a source of frustration among Indian security 
commentators. Accordingly, at least part of the appeal of traveling to Israel for Indian 
officials was to fulfill the fantasy of becoming a “hard”, militarist state and in doing so 
consolidating the idea of a common Islamist other (see Oza, 2007).  
 In the remainder of this paper, I place the decision to learn from Israel in relation 
to the local political context of post-26/11 Mumbai, focusing on what Clarke (2012: 34) 
calls the “local politics of fast policy” – i.e. the ways in which forms of policy mobility 
are used by local actors to negotiate conflicts and struggles. Here Mountz and Curran’s 
(2009) account of former New York City mayor Rudolf Giuliani’s visit to Mexico City to 
unveil “Plan Giuliani” as a masculinized performance is instructive. The popularity of 
Giuliani’s proposals, they argue, does not reflect their capacity to reduce crime. Rather 
the Plan “worked”, they argue, by “produc[ing] a ‘cult of personality’” that leveraged 
Giuliani’s reputation as a “tough guy” (Mountz and Curran, 2009: 1034). As such, Plan 
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Giuliani essentially amounted to a strategy to enhance the standing of the Mexico City 
police.   
Sivanandan’s endorsement of an Israeli approach to counter-terrorism similarly 
worked by leveraging Israeli’s status as a global security leader to bolster the authority of 
the Mumbai police. As one newspaper article claimed: “Post the November 26, 2008 
attack, Israel seems to have become the answer to most of Mumbai police’s problems” 
(Tiwary, 2009b). This statement is correct, albeit with one important caveat, which is that 
the problem being solved was a matter of the Mumbai police’s institutional credibility. 
This is not to underplay the very real problems within the Mumbai police. It is simply to 
say that the use of Israeli security experts was never intended to bring about a radical 
overhaul of the city’s counter-terror approaches. The target of this measure was 
something else entirely.                  
In addition to playing a role as performative demonstration of security 
competence, learning from Israel also helped Indian authorities to negotiate a number of 
controversies to which the handling of 26/11 had given rise. First, politicians from the 
opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) tried to make political gains from the perceived 
mishandling of the attacks by the ruling Congress government. An advertisement taken 
out by the BJP in major Indian dailies featured the slogan “Brutal Terror Strikes at Will. 
Weak Government, Unwilling and Incapable”, as well as “Fight Terror. Vote BJP” (cited 
in Kolås, 2010: 89). Second, there were a number of rumors surrounding the deaths of 
three senior police officers (including sitting ATS chief Hemant Karkare) who were 
killed during the attacks under mysterious circumstances. These questions re-emerged 
with the publication of books by Vinita Kamte, the wife of one of the slain officers 
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(Kamte and Deshmukh, 2009) and a bestseller by a retired Indian police officer (Mushrif, 
2009).14 While the substance of such allegations is not relevant here, the point is that 
26/11 remained a site of controversy and source of pressure on the government of 
Maharashtra and the Mumbai police throughout 2009.15 Third, while the Committee’s 
recommendations clearly did not inform the decision to learn from Israel, it was shortly 
after the decision to withhold the Report that the government sent its delegation to Israel 
to seek expertise on combating terrorism. The press reports on the visit to Israel came 
only a month after the government had announced its partial rejection of the document.  
In the context of ongoing calls from the BJP and the Bombay High Court for the 
Report’s release, the decision to send the delegation to Israel thus can be seen to have 
offered a temporary distraction. As Vappala Balachandran the Report’s co-author 
emphasized to me, it was curious that “before…[the] Maharashtra government even 
digested our report, the first action that they took was to send a delegation to Israel”. He 
noted that he and Ram Pradhan “did not want these people [the delegation] to go and get 
lessons from Israel because what they’re practicing is not applicable here at all. We have 
a different type of public [in India]”.16 In a 2011 op-ed, Balachandran went on to 
challenge the premise of these excursions, arguing that such “[f]oreign jaunts […] will 
not improve our counter-terrorist methodology” (Balachandran, 2011), insinuating that 
                                                        
14 Karkare’s death was deeply significant symbolically. In addition to being one of the most senior IPS 
officers in the Maharashtra Police at the time of his death, he was leading an  
extremely controversial case against instigators of Hindutva terror groups surrounding the 2006  
Malegaon blasts. Mushrif’s account as well as others have suggested that 26/11 may have been  
engineered as a conspiracy to kill Karkare and thereby prevent his cases from proceeding against  
a number of high profile figures in the RSS from going forward. 
15 Newly appointed ATS chief Rakesh Maria threatened to resign in protest over questions raised about his 
activities during 26/11 by Vinita Kamte and others around the first anniversary of the attack. 
16 Fmr. Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat (Ret’d), co-author of the HLEC Report 
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the impulse to send its officials abroad was designed as a diversion from the Report’s 
findings.          
The delegation to Israel did more than simply divert attention from the Report: it 
helped to frame the understanding of the problem of Mumbai’s security preparedness in a 
particular way. Walters’ (2008) approach to “anti-policy” provides a useful vantage point 
from which to analyze the impulse to learn from Israel. As he argues, it is tempting to see 
what he calls “anti-policy” (such as anti-terrorism, anti-racism, etc.) as a kind of policy 
that emerges to prohibit, limit or prevent things from occurring. Yet he presents an 
alternative position by suggesting that anti-policy is not, in fact, a particular variety of 
policy. It can be better understood, he argues, “as an analytic” or a kind of “sensitizing 
device” (269). In making this argument, Walters asserts that it is important to draw 
attention to the “positivity of anti-policy” in the sense that “the objective of negating 
things frequently goes hand-in-hand with calling something new into existence” (275). In 
other words, rather than simply “responding” to a set of pre-existing policy problems, 
anti-policy plays a key role in their very constitution as such.    
 We can see this performative tendency in the deference to Israeli security experts 
following 26/11. Enrolling Israeli security experts became generative of the policy 
problem by helping to promote notion that the failure of 26/11 was attributable to a lack 
of modern counter-terror expertise within the Mumbai police. We can see that sending 
officials to Israel helped to diagnose Mumbai’s security problems, thereby offering the 
potential to (re)make the issues at hand. Whereas the Report focused on deep institutional 
and coordination problems within the Mumbai police, a lack of basic police training, 
political interference and red tape in the police’s procurement process, recourse to Israeli 
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expertise gave the impression that problems were attributable to a lack of specialized 
knowhow, which could be easily remedied by learning from Israel. This move allowed 
the government of Maharashtra to frame the policy problem on its own terms. In other 
words, deferring to Israel helped the to define 26/11’s security lapses as a narrow 
“technical” matter, ignoring the Report’s findings.     
This diagnosis further helped to police the very terms of failure by “patrolling the 
facts” (Ericson 1989) about how the events of 26/11 unfolded and the specific lapses they 
may have revealed. As the handling of the Report suggests, Maharashtra politicians were 
far less interested in finding out about the existence of potential security lapses and how 
they could be remedied than they were in looking for ways they could “solve” the issue 
of terrorism on their own terms. The efforts by governmental authorities to suppress the 
Report’s findings have thus given rise to a situation where, although there is virtual 
consensus that the handling of 26/11 represents a failure of local capacity, an 
understanding of what exactly failed remains far less clear. Indeed, the policy response 
has worked to obfuscate important details about how the attack actually unfolded and 
who or what might be responsible for alleged security lapses.    
So far we have seen that deference to Israeli security experts was used to 
performatively demonstrate a claim to authority by way of association with the “killer 
instinct” of Israel. As I further emphasized above, official accounts of best practices were 
hardly smooth or straightforward. While their accounts of learning were incoherent and 
contradictory and did not readily explain anything, what my conversations with officials 
did quite clearly reveal was that best practice claims were self-affirming. Embedded in 
the best designation is a not so subtle normative judgment that effectively justified the 
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impulse to seek Israeli expertise. Indeed, throughout my encounters with officials, the 
premise of learning served as an end in itself. As Maharashtra’s former ATS chief 
emphasized to me: “There is no point in reinventing the wheel again when there is 
something better already available in the market. So if they’re having some capability 
[elsewhere]…why not know from them?”.17 Thus the very opportunity to learn from 
elsewhere became its own justification where the mere existence of allegedly superior 
expertise was presented as the chief reason to seek it out.  
Officials also sought to present the issue of superiority as a closed matter of 
professional consensus, which defied the need for any kind of analysis or discussion. In 
fact, my search for the reasons behind the impulse to seek best practices was effectively 
rebuffed by officials, who claimed that their decisions were so obviously beneficial as to 
actually preclude the need for any explanation. During these conversations I was 
frequently challenged about my apparent skepticism regarding best practices, with 
officials stressing that they could see no downsides of learning from others. They 
effectively inverted my question of “why learn?” into “why not learn?”.  Best practices 
are best, they claimed, because they are best, and therefore inherently good, irrespective 
of any other consideration. These elusive, even evasive dimensions of best practice 
claims point to the need to address questions about the depoliticizing consequences of  
policy mobility more closely.          
4. Best practice as depoliticization?      
 As we have seen, officials used a language of best practice to suggest that the 
impulse to learn from Israel was effectively beyond question. Embedded within the logic 
                                                        
17 Fmr. Anti-Terrorism Squad chief, Maharashtra State Police   
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of best practice there is also a decidedly anti-political tendency in the sense that it 
substitutes a communicative rationality of politics with a “one-sided” form of 
technocratic rationality (Schedler, 1997). The language of best practice works to 
“‘predetermine’ decisions and/or social and public outcomes” (Büsher, 2010: 34) as 
somehow natural or preordained. As Morell and Lucas (2012: 187) point out, calls to 
adopt ‘best practices’ in policy discussions represent “an attempt to depoliticize 
(rhetorically) and strip away ideological aspects to activities and practices that are 
inherently political and ideological”.  Given that the core logic of best practice is a 
technocratic one, it also has an obvious resonance with debates about the privatization 
and depoliticization of security. A number of Foucaudian-inspired studies have argued 
that the use of private actors can be used by states to actively manipulate, suppress or 
sidestep deliberative debate and evade democratic accountability (e.g. Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2007a, 2007b; Leander and van Munster, 2007). Drawing on Rose and Miller’s 
(1992) notion of “governmental technologies”, such account suggest that the rise of 
private actors has served to depoliticize security questions by rendering them as technical 
matters in need of management. 
These approaches are helpful to a degree. As illustrated above, the use of Israeli 
experts has worked to diagnose the policy problem of urban security preparedness in a 
narrow technical way. Yet thinking about best practice as a technology of governing, 
which offers a clean alternative to politics, is neither terribly helpful in understanding the 
case at hand nor does it provide a fruitful way to approach the anti-political dimensions 
of security policymaking in general. While sharing many of the same concerns as Rose 
and Miller, Barry (2002) has critiqued their approach for framing politics as excessively 
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technical. This, he argues, has the problematic tendency to render strategies of governing 
as purely instrumental activities or techniques. As he reminds us: “Politics, after all, is 
both about contestation, and the containment of contestation [...] It is about conflict, 
negotiation and the resolution of conflict” (270). So while acknowledging that politics 
can assume a technical quality, it is critical to resist the impulse to frame politics as a 
smooth (and purely technical) matter. As he further points out, “what is commonly 
termed politics is not necessarily – or generally – political in its consequences” […] 
Indeed, one might say that one of the core functions of politics has been, and should be, 
to place limits on the political” (270). Seen in this light the depoliticizing implications of 
best practice learning clearly do not signify an end of politics, even though the deference 
to Israel clearly helped to delimit space for disagreement about what took place on 26/11, 
who or what was responsible for alleged failures and what might help to resolve them.  
Although best practice learning offered local officials a convenient technocratic 
language to explain their activities, this should not be seen as evidence that they were 
implementing some predefined (technical) policy regime. They were clearly not. What is 
quite striking about the process of learning from Israel is the absence of engagement with 
systematic comparisons of any kind. Determining Mumbai’s security needs or Israel’s 
status as a best practice did not take place through some process of ranking or 
benchmarking. While the delegation to Israel was legitimated on the basis of a need to 
seek various technical fixes, there is nothing particularly technical about this entire 
episode. This raises questions about how learning from Israel actually worked anti-
politically.        
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Walters’ approach to anti-policy offers some useful insights here. As he points 
out, it is tempting to suggest that anti-policy goes hand-in-hand with processes of 
depoliticization because anti-policy schemes take place through the imposition of 
technocratic expertise onto a field that might ordinarily be understood as a site of political 
controversy. Yet, as Walters points out, this is the case in all governmental schemes 
rather than something specific to anti-policy regimes. In this sense reading anti-politics in 
terms of the imposition of a technical rationality is too general to do much explanatory 
work. Walters therefore argues that two additional criteria are necessary to forge a more 
robust connection between anti-politics and anti-policy. The first is what he calls the 
“externalization effect,” whereby the state is positioned as a source of protection and 
security rather than as the source of the problems that anti-policy schemes claim to 
address. Second, and more pertinent here, is what Walters (2008: 281) calls the “black 
mail of security”, which sets up anti-policy regimes as something which one cannot 
possibly be against.       
We can see that the anti-politics of best practice learning works in a similar way. 
By naming Israeli expertise best practice, Mumbai officials were able to set it up as a 
policy measure to which could not reasonably be opposed. What gives best practice its 
rhetorical force, then, is not simply its capacity to render erstwhile political issues as 
technical matters but rather because it makes a move that is, by its own tautological 
definition, good. Asking why something that has already been normatively anointed as 
best is worthwhile pursuing simply does not get very far. As I quickly found out, claims 
to best-ness proved to be slippery and even resistant to interrogation. Official accounts of 
best practice effectively foreclosed the very premise of inquiry by presenting the efficacy 
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of certain practices as self-evident and immune from analysis – a foregone conclusion no 
longer amenable to reevaluation or debate. For instance, when I asked Sivanandan about 
how the decision to seek lessons from Israel emerged, he responded that “It was a need, it 
was [decided] with the best of intentions and the best of knowledge…done”.18 In this way 
the self-referential logic of best practice provided officials with a façade of intuitiveness 
behind which they could quite readily hide. The loose qualities of best practice learning 
are not incidental; they are a central part of its work as an elusive strategy of governing. 
Though official rationalizations were inconsistent and incoherent, the various 
contradictions embedded in them proved to be an convenient way to reassemble the 
“facts” of 26/11 into a new narrative of learning and modernization which highlights 
certain developments while making other dimensions disappear. Specifically, learning 
from Israel was used to simultaneously respond to public misgivings over Mumbai’s 
security preparedness, yet to do so in a way that is somehow not an indictment of local 
incompetence.    
This seems to be one of the most important features of transnational policy 
schemes that operate without any discernible standard: they can claim to improve security 
preparedness in ways that do not displace pre-existing local approaches. Though this 
clearly defies the basic functionalist logic that serves as the underlying premise of best 
practice learning, it has an element of expediency to it. The visit to Israel can be 
portrayed as straightforward, functionally driven, and beyond the realm of debate. And 
because no Israeli standard is ever defined, there are no specific grounds on which to 
even assess, let alone contest, the claims to efficacy. All of this suggests the need for 
                                                        
18 Sivanandan 
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greater care and precision in the way we think about how security policymaking relates to 
questions of politics and the political. Simply saying that the rendering of security issues 
as objects of techno-managerial strategies depoliticizes them is simply too easy. Nor is 
such a move terribly productive analytically. It tells us precious little about how these 
schemes actually function and how regimes of security governance might differ in 
character from others.  
Conclusion  
In this article I have argued that issues of politics and anti-politics should be 
placed front and center in understanding why transnational policy learning has become 
increasingly salient as strategies of contemporary urban security governance. In doing so, 
it makes three contributions. First, it shows precisely how the decision to learn from 
Israel was used circumscribe the space of debate on matters of security preparedness in 
the city. Here I have contested the widespread claim among critical security scholars and 
other theorists that depoliticization takes place by rendering erstwhile political issues as 
technical ones. I have argued that anti-political implications of best practice learning 
should be conceptualized as part of the operation of politics rather than an alternative to 
it, further challenging the notion that best practice learning is, in fact, really very 
technical all. Second, by situating policy responses to terroristic events as forms of 
performative politics, I have shown how counter-terror policy decisions become 
generative of policy problems. In this sense, policies should not be understood as a 
resolution to a pre-given set of problems (technical, political or otherwise) but rather as a 
kind of policy diagnostic, which enacts realities it claims to only describe and respond to. 
Third, in bringing debates about “urban geopolitics” (Graham 2004) into conversation 
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with those about the local politics and anti-politics of policy mobility, I have helped to 
correct the prevailing Western bias in debates about transnational security governance 
(Hönke and Müller 2012). This is crucial in two senses: it locates policy actors in the 
global south as part of rather than external to the global politics of security and shows 
how actors re-appropriate and thereby reinvent transnational policy regimes (Amar 
2013). In representing Israeli urban security knowhow as a best practice, then, it is not 
that Maharashtra officials misread its true character. Instead, we can say that they took 
something already there –Israel’s status as a global leader in matters of security – and 
remade this image in relation to their own local circumstances. Learning from Israel 
notably “worked” as a signifier of rapid and totalizing policy transformation, whilst 
paradoxically giving rise to very few (if any) tangible results. These findings further 
trouble the idea that the Israeli “model” of homeland security exists as a fixed body of 
knowledge with a set of necessary practical outcomes. This model is an elusive construct, 
which exists only to the extent to which “it” is enrolled by others and becomes 
relationally defined through these encounters.  
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